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Abstract
Virtual asset service providers currently face a number of challenges, both from the
technological and the regulatory perspectives. One key issue is the need for VASPs
to obtain, validate, retain and securely exchange customer information in the context
of virtual asset transfers as part of compliance to the Travel Rule. Unlike traditional
financial institutions, the VASP community currently still lacks the infrastructures that
engender business-trust based on sound technical-trust. The current work discusses the
need for a VASP information sharing network as one form of a trust infrastructure aimed
at VASP-to-VASP secure interactions. The goal is to allow VASPs to authenticate each
other, to ascertain the business legal status of other VASPs, and to support the secure
and confidential sharing of customer account information as required by the Travel Rule.
We discuss the need for a trusted identity infrastructure for VASPs, allowing customers
and regulators to obtain assurance regarding the digital identity and Internet presence
of a VASP. For customers of VASPs there is a need for seamless integration between
the VASP information sharing network with the existing consumer identity management
infrastructure, providing a user-friendly experience for transferring virtual assets to other
users.
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1 Introduction
It has been over a decade since the advent of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency system [1] based
on the hash-chain model of Haber and Stornetta [2, 3]. Considerable interest, hype and
speculative investments have gone into various projects on blockchains aimed at developing
decentralized virtual asset ecosystems. At the same time, there has been a growing trend of
theft and misappropriation of virtual assets (e.g. see [4, 5, 6]). Additionally, crypto-currencies
are still being exploited for money-laundering [7, 8, 9], raising significant concern on the part
of regulators and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) organizations.
The FATF Recommendation No. 15 that was finalized in mid-2019 provided an unambigu-
ous definition of virtual assets and virtual asset service providers (VASP). This places VASPs
under much of the same AML-related regulations as that of traditional financial institutions,
notably the Travel Rule. In short, the Travel Rule requires VASPs to obtain, validate and
retain their customer information. In the case of virtual asset transfers between VASPs, the
respective VASPs must additionally exchange validated customer information. However, cur-
rently VASPs do not as yet have an agreed mechanisms to exchange their respective customer
information in a secure and reliable manner.
This lack of a VASP information sharing network points to the need for the VASP com-
munity globally to view the problem in broader terms, namely for the VASP community to
develop trust infrastructures that will provide the foundation for the future financial ecosys-
tem based on virtual assets.
In the current work we discuss the need for a VASP information sharing network as one
form of a trust infrastructure aimed at VASP-to-VASP secure interactions. The main purpose
of a VASP information sharing network is to securely and confidentially share customer
information related to transfers of virtual assets, with customer consent. Related to the
information sharing network is the corresponding need for a VASP identity infrastructure
that allows VASPs not only to authenticate each other, but also to rapidly obtain the legal
business information about other registered VASPs.
Finally, there is a need for the emerging information sharing network to integrate seam-
lessly with the existing user (customer) digital identity infrastructure. Proper integration is
needed in order to permit VASPs to authenticate customers as they connect to the VASP
platform, and in order for VASPs to obtain consent to deliver the customer information to
other VASPs following the Travel Rule.
For customers opting for crypto-wallets – which holds the private-public keys – VASPs
must ensure that only registered wallets and keys are used in their ecosystem. This implies
that other forms of trust infrastructures will be required in the future, dealing with the
challenges around wallet device identities and wallet device attestations.
The recent (July 2020) FATF 12-Month Review [10] of the standards for virtual assets
and VASPs makes it clear that more development is need to address the various challenges
related to the VASP function and role.
3
2 The Travel Rule and VASP Customer Information
With the emergence of blockchain technologies, virtual assets and cryptocurrencies, the FATF
recognized the need to adequately mitigate the money laundering (ML) and terrorist financ-
ing (TF) risks associated with virtual asset activities. The Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) is an inter-governmental body established in 1989 by the ministers of its member
countries or jurisdictions. The objectives of the FATF are to set standards and promote
effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international
financial system [11].
2.1 Virtual Assets and VASPs
The FATF Recommendation 15 [12] defines a virtual asset as a digital representation of
value that can be digitally traded, or transferred, and can be used for payment or investment
purposes. Virtual assets do not include digital representations of fiat currencies, securities and
other financial assets that are already covered elsewhere in the FATF Recommendations. The
FATF defines a virtual asset service provider (VASP) to be any natural or legal person who is
not covered elsewhere under the Recommendations, and as a business conducts one or more
of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of another natural or legal person:
(i) exchange between virtual assets and fiat currencies; (ii) exchange between one or more
forms of virtual assets; (iii) transfer of virtual assets; (iv) safekeeping and/or administration
of virtual assets or instruments enabling control over virtual assets; and (v) participation in
and provision of financial services related to an issuer’s offer and/or sale of a virtual asset.
The implication of the Recommendation 15 [12, 13] is that cryptocurrency exchanges and
related VASPs must be able to share the originator and beneficiary information for virtual
assets transactions. This process – also known as the Travel Rule – originates from under the
US Bank Secrecy Act (BSA - 31 USC 5311 - 5330), which mandates that financial institutions
deliver certain types of information to the next financial institution when a funds transmittal
event involves more than one financial institution. This customer information includes (i)
originator’s name; (ii) originator’s account number (e.g. at the Originating-VASP); (iii)
originator’s geographical address, or national identity number, or customer identification
number (or date and place of birth); (iv) beneficiary’s name; (v) beneficiary account number
(e.g. at the Beneficiary-VASP).
2.2 The Travel Rule and Customer Information
It is important to emphasize that a VASP as a business entity must be able to respond
comprehensively to legitimate inquiries from law enforcement regarding one or more of its
customers owning virtual assets (e.g. legal SAR inquiries/warrants). More specifically, both
the Originator-VASP and Beneficiary-VASP must possess the complete and accurate actual
personal information (i.e. data) regarding their account holders (i.e. customer). This is the
main crux of the Travel Rule.
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This need for actual data precludes the use of advanced cryptographic techniques that
aim to prevent disclosure while yielding implied knowledge, such as those based on Zero-
Knowledge Proof (ZKP) schemes [14]. It is insufficient for a Beneficiary-VASP to exe-
cute a multi-round ZKP protocol with an Originator-VASP, with the goal of convincing the
Originator-VASP that the Beneficiary-VASP holds true information regarding the beneficiary
(without disclosing the actual beneficiary information to the Originator-VASP).
The aim of the Travel Rule is not for a Beneficiary-VASP to achieve privacy-protection
against the Originator-VASP or against regulators. Instead the goal is to exchange actual
customer information in order for both VASPs as regulated businesses to comply to AML
regulations related to the Travel Rule. Completion of a ZKP protocol execution does not
constitute evidence of equivalent legal standing as that of actual verified data – whose prove-
nance and source-authenticity has been proven. If a Beneficiary-VASP is unable to furnish
the necessary beneficiary information, then the Originator-VASP can choose to decline the
transfer request from the originator customer.
In the next section we discuss the notion of an information sharing network for VASPs
where the originator and beneficiary information can be exchanged between VASPs.
3 An Information Sharing Network for VASPs
The notion of an out-of-band (off-chain) network for VASPs to share information about them-
selves and their customers was first proposed in [15] as part of the broader discussion within
the FATF Private Sector Consultative Forum leading up to the finalization of Recommen-
dation 15 in mid-2019. The idea of an information sharing network is not new and has in
fact been in operation within the banking sector for several decades. In order to securely
exchange the various customer information and data, the banking community established the
SWIFT network [16] over two decades ago. Today this network is a foundational backbone
for global correspondent banking [17].
As such, similar to these banking networks, a “network” is needed for VASPs to securely
exchange information about themselves and about their customer for Travel Rule compliance.
This information sharing network should be layered atop the TCP/IP Internet, in order to
provide the best connection resilience and speed.
3.1 General Requirements for VASP Information Sharing Network
There are several fundamental requirements for an information sharing network for VASPs
(Figure 1):
• Security, reliability and confidentiality of transport: The VASP information sharing
network must provide security, reliability and confidentiality of communications be-
tween an Originator-VASP and Beneficiary-VASP. Several standards exists to fulfil this
requirement (e.g. IPsec VPNs [18, 19], TLS secure channels [20, 21], etc.).
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Network-wide broadcasts or multicasts must be limited to only VASP participants of
the network, and must achieve the same security level as the pairwise communications
mentioned previously.
• Strong end-point identification and authentication: VASPs must employ strong endpoint
identification and authentication mechanisms to ensure source/destination authenticity
and to prevent (reduce) of man-in-the-middle types of attacks. Mechanisms such as
X.509 certificates [22, 23] have been used for over two decades across various industries,
government and defense as a practical means to achieve this goal [15].
• Correlation of customer information with on-chain transactions: There must be a mech-
anism to permit a VASP to accurately correlate (match) between customer information
(exchanged within the VASP information sharing network) and the blockchain transac-
tions belonging to the respective customers. This must be true also in the case of batch
transactions performed by a VASP (e.g. in the commingled accounts business model).
• Consent from originator and beneficiary for customer information exchange: Unam-
biguous and explicit consent [24] must be obtained by VASPs from their customers
with regards to the transmittal of customer personal information to another VASP.
Explicit consent must also be obtained from the beneficiary for receiving asset transfers
from an originator. That is, a Beneficiary-VASP must obtain consent from its customer
to receive asset transfers into the customer’s account.
Efforts are currently underway to begin addressing the need for a VASP information sharing
network to support VASPs in complying to the various aspects of the Travel Rule (see [25, 26]).
A standard customer information model has recently been developed [27] that would allow
VASPs to interoperate with each other with semantic consistency.
3.2 Other Uses of the VASP Information Sharing Network
There are several potential uses of the VASP information sharing network beyond the ex-
change of VASP and customer information. One potential use is for the delivery of device
attestations [28, 29] from wallet systems used by customers. Device attestations permits
VASPs to obtain better visibility into the internal state of regulated wallets that are associ-
ated with their customer accounts. We discuss this topic further below.
4 A Trusted Identity Infrastructure for VASPs
In order for a VASP information sharing network to be achieved, one broad requirement is
for the strong identification of VASPs.
This is another form of trust infrastructures we described earlier, which here we refer to as
the VASP trusted identity infrastructure. This identity infrastructure must not only provide
legal information regarding a VASP’s business identity, but also provide a mechanism to bind
the digital identity of the VASP with its public-key(s).
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Figure 1: Overview of VASP Information Sharing Network (after [15, 25])
A trusted identity infrastructure must address the various challenges around VASP iden-
tities:
• Discovery of VASPs and their business status: Mechanism are needed to permit any
entity on the Internet to ascertain whether a virtual asset service provider is a regulated
VASP within a given jurisdiction. This question is relevant not only ordinary users,
but also to new VASPs (i.e. VASPs who have never interacted before).
When an customer (originator) of an Originator-VASP requests assets to be trans-
ferred to the beneficiary who is a customer of a Beneficiary-VASP located in a different
jurisdiction (e.g. country), the Originator-VASP must be able to locate the Beneficiary-
VASP (e.g. service endpoint) but also be able to rapidly determine the business and
legal status of the Beneficiary-VASP.
• Verification of VASP public-keys: Mechanism are needed to permit any entity on the
Internet to ascertain whether a given public-key legally belongs to a given VASP.
Depending on the business model, VASPs may own one or more private-public key pairs
for signing transactions on the blockchain (e.g. commingled accounts where customers
hold no keys).
• Verification of VASP service endpoints: When two VASPs interact with one another
in the context of the Travel Rule (e.g. exchanging customer information) there is a
need for mechanisms to provide assurance to both VASPs that that are connection to
their respective legitimate service endpoints (and not a rogue endpoints belonging to
an attacker).
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4.1 Extended Validation Certificates for VASPs Business Identity
As mentioned previously, key challenges for VASPs today are the discovery of other VASPs
and their legal status, and the verification of the public-key of VASPs as a legal business
entities.
A similar problem was faced over a decade ago in the context of web-service identification.
For the end-user (i.e. home consumer) it was increasingly difficult to distinguish between
a legitimate service provider (e.g. online merchant) from rogue web-servers that mimic the
look-and-feel of legitimate merchants. The use of plain digital certificates following the X.509
standard [22, 23] issued by a Certification Authority (CA) had limited effect because rogue
web-servers were able to obtain or self-issue these X.509 certificates and non-technical users
had difficulty in distinguishing among certificates.
In response to a growing trend of man-in-the-middle attacks, a number of browser vendors
established an alliance in the late 2000s – called the CA Browser Forum – with the goal of en-
hancing the plain X.509 certificate with additional business related information. These X.509
certificates are referred to as Extended Validation (EV) identity certificates [30], because ad-
ditional (extended) verifications of business information must be performed by the CA as
the issuer. By issuing (signing) an EV-certificate, the CA asserts that it has performed the
necessary legal verifications regarding the subject of the certificate. The set of information
carried inside a certificate is defined in a specification referred to as the Certificate Profile [22].
Some of the VASP business information to be included in the VASP identity EV-certificate
are as follows [25]:
• Organization name: The Organization field must contain the full legal name of the
VASP legal entity controlling the VASP service endpoint, as listed in the official records
in the VASP’s jurisdiction.
• VASP Alternative Name Extension: The Domain Name(s) owned or controlled by the
VASP and to be associated with the VASP’s server as the endpoint associated with the
certificate.
• VASP Incorporation Number or LEI (if available): This field must contain the unique
Incorporation Number assigned by the Incorporating Agency in the jurisdiction of in-
corporation. If a LEI number [31] is available, then the LEI number should be used
instead.
• VASP Address of Place of Business: This is the address of the physical location of the
VASP’s Place of Business.
• VASP Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration: This field contain information that
is relevant to the level of the Incorporating Agency or Registration Agency.
• VASP Number: This is the globally unique VASP number, if used (see OpenVASP [26]).
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• VASP Regulated Business Activity: Currently, no formal definition of business activity
specific for VASPs have been defined. Note that in reality VASPs may operate different
functions in the virtual assets ecosystem (e.g. crypto-exchanges, virtual asset based
fund managers, stablecoin issuers, etc.).
Examples of business activities typically found in existing EV certificates include (i) Pri-
vate Organization, )ii) Government Entity, (iii) Business Entity and Non-Commercial
Entity, and so on.
• EV Certificate Policy Object Identifier: This is the identifier for the policies defined by
the consortium.
4.2 VASP Transactions-signing and Claims-signing Certificates
For asset transfers in commingled accounts scenarios, the asset transfer on the blockchain is
performed by the VASP using its own private-public key pair on behalf of the customer. The
customer holds no keys in the commingled cases. We refer to these private-public keys as the
VASP transactions signing-keys, and we refer to corresponding certificate as the transactions
signing-key certificates. The purpose of signing-key certificates is to certify the ownership of
the private-public keys as belonging to the VASP. A given VASP may own multiple transac-
tions signing-keys and therefore multiple signing-key certificates.
Because a VASP must stand behind the customer information it provides to other VASPs,
any claims [32] or assertions [33] that a VASP produces about its customers must be digitally
signed by the VASP. We refer to these private-public keys as claims signing-keys, and we refer
to corresponding certificate as the claims signing-key certificates.
It is crucial for a VASP that these three (3) key-pairs be distinct. This is because the key-
usage purpose of the keys are different, and each key may have differing lifetime durations.
Depending on the profile of a transactions signing-key certificate and the claims signing-key
certificate, they may include the serial number (or hash) of the identity EV-certificate of the
VASP. This provides a mechanism for a recipient to validate that the owner of these two
certificates is the same legal entity as the owner of the VASP identity EV-certificate.
4.3 Consortium-based VASP Certificate Hierarchy
In order for VASPs to have a high degree of interoperability – at both the technical and
legal levels – a consortium arrangement provides a number of advantages for the information
sharing network. Members in a consortium are free to define the common operating rules that
each member must abide by. The operating rules become input matter into the definition of
the legal trust framework which expresses the contractual obligations of the members.
A well-crafted set of operating rules for a VASP information sharing network provides its
members with the several benefits. First, it provides a means for the members to improve
risk management because the operating rules will allow members to quantify and manage
risks inherent in participating within the network. Secondly, the operating rules provides its
members with legal certainty and predictability by addressing the legal rights, responsibilities,
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Figure 2: Overview of certificate hierarchy for VASP consortium
and liabilities of participating within the network. Thirdly, the operating rules provides
transparency to the members of the network by having all members agree to the same terms
of membership (i.e. contract). Since the operating rules is a legal agreement, it is legally
enforceable upon all members. Finally, a set of operating rules which define common technical
specifications (e.g. APIs, cryptographic functions, certificates, etc.), for all the members
provides the highest chance of technical interoperability of services, In turn, this reduces
overall system-development costs by allowing entities to re-use implementations of those
standardized technical specifications. Several examples of consortium-based operating rules
exist today (e.g. NACHA [34], Visa [35], OIX [36]).
Using the identity EV-certificates mentioned above as a specific case, the common oper-
ating rules would define the technical specification (profile) of the EV-certificate (e.g. cryp-
tographic algorithms, key lengths, issuance protocol, revocation protocol, etc.), as well as
the legal information that must be included in the EV fields of the certificate (e.g. legal
incorporation number, LEI number, place of business, etc.).
Business interoperability can only be achieved if all members of the information sharing
network observe and implement these common operating rules, and when there is legal and
monetary liability for not doing so. A contract without any liabilities on the parties will
not motivate the parties to fulfill the terms of the contract. This approach is also used for
group peering agreements among IP routing service providers (i.e. ISPs). Technological
interoperability of identity EV-certificates dictates that members of the information sharing
network participate under a common certificate hierarchy, that is rooted at the consortium
organization. This is shown in Figure 2, where the consortium becomes the Root-CA for the
certificates issued to all VASPs in the consortium organization.
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Certificate hierarchies have been successfully deployed in numerous organizations, rang-
ing from government organizations [37], to financial networks [16], to mobile devices and
networks [38, 39], to consortiums of device manufacturers.
An example of a consortiums of device manufacturers is that of Cable Laboratories (Ca-
bleLabs) [40, 41]. CableLabs represents the consortium of manufacturers and cable operators
in North America. Their devices (Cable Modems and Set-Top-Boxes (STB)) can be found
today in the majority of homes cable-TV services and Internet access services. Each device
ships with a unique X.509 certificate, with the private-public key embedded in the device [42].
In order to achieve interoperability in the field of deployment, CableLabs created a certificate
hierarchy that includes device manufacturers and cable-service operators. To distinguish be-
tween these types of entities, separate subordinate certificate hierarchies are used for device
manufacturers and cable-service operators. Each device manufacturer is assigned their own
subordinate root CA certificate, with the manufacturer holding the private-key [43].
This approach allows manufacturers the freedom to generate any number of key-pairs and
issue device-certificates in the manufacturing phase. The manufacturers have the assurance
that when the cable-modems and STB devices are plugged into the consumer home, the
device can immediately authenticate itself to the cable-service operator offering services to
the home. For the content provider (e.g. TV channels), they obtain the assurance that the
cable-service operator will only provide access to devices that have successfully authenticate
themeless (i.e genuine device from device manufacturer).
This instant interoperability was achievable because both subordinate certificate hierar-
chies – the manufacturer hierarchy and and operators hierarchy – chained-up to the same
common Root-CA certificate owned by the CableLabs consortium.
There are a number of benefits of the consortium arrangement with the certificate hier-
archies:
• Certificate issuance based on a common legal framework: As a certification authority,
the consortium organization publishes Certification Practices Statement (CPS) docu-
ment, which is a form of a legal service level agreement (SLA) to which all consortium
members must abide. This allows VASPs to develop their respective business models
based on a common set of certificate processing procedures (the “plumbing”), thereby
allowing VASPs to focus on the higher-layer aspects of their business that are more
profitable (namely virtual assets).
• Efficient VASP certificate-status check: By sharing a certificate hierarchy that chains-
up to a common consortium-level Root-CA certificate, a given VASP can very quickly
and efficiently validate the status of the certificate of another VASP. This then allows
a secure channel between VASPs on the network to be established, allowing VASPs to
quickly exchange customer information as required by the Travel Rule.
• Scalability through bridge certificate: When two VASP communities (e.g. in different
jurisdictions) employ the above certificate-hierarchies model, the communities can es-
tablish a bridge certificate that permits members in one community to ascertain whether
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a VASP belong to the other community. A bridge certificate allows VASPs in one com-
munity (consortium) to quickly and efficiently validate the status of VASPs in another
community (consortium) in a different legal jurisdictions (e.g. different country).
5 Beneficiary Consent
As alluded to previously, consent management represents another challenge faced by VASPs.
The information sharing network permits VASPs to obtain consent from originators and
beneficiaries, transported within the “network” (from VASP to VASP). We briefly discuss
this topic in this section.
5.1 Types of Consent
We distinguish are two general types of consent, relating to transactions and to customer
information:
• Consent for release of the customer account information: In order for an Originator-
VASP to comply to the Travel Rule, it must obtain accurate and verifiable information
about the beneficiary from the Beneficiary-VASP. Similarly, the Originator-VASP must
provide the originator customer information to the Beneficiary-VASP.
The originator, being the customer that initiates the asset transfer, must implicitly
agree for its data to be delivered to the Beneficiary-VASP. Generally speaking, VASPs
need to ensure that their customers are fully aware of the Travel Rule requirements.
• Beneficiary consent to receive virtual asset transfer: Since transactions on a blockchain
are difficult to reverse or roll-back once the transaction-block has been confirmed, ex-
plicit consent must be obtained by the Beneficiary-VASP from the beneficiary prior to
the commencement of the transfer.
This is not only to prevent errors, but also to prevent the beneficiary from being falsely
incriminated (“framed”) by a dishonest originator or dishonest Originator-VASP.
Within certain jurisdictions the operational requirements may be more stringent. For
example, in Switzerland the FINMA ordinance on Anti-Money Laundering (AMLO) makes it
unambiguously clear that no exception is permitted for payments (i.e. virtual asset transfers)
involving “unregulated wallet providers” [44]. This rule, among others, is to prevent (reduce)
problems faced by supervised providers (i.e. VASPs) in cases where it has to deal with virtual
asset transfers from an unregulated wallet provider.
5.2 Overview of Consent Flows
Figure 3 provides an overview of message flows over the information sharing network, includ-
ing obtaining the beneficiary consent. We use the PayID [45] notation for Alice and Bob,
where Alice is known as alice$ovasp.com and Bob is known as bob$bvasp.com. For brevity,
12
Figure 3: Overview of beneficiary consent in the key-custodial model
we omit the resolution protocol to map from the PayID identifier to the public-key. Figure 3
assumes a key-custodial account configuration, where the VASPs hold the private-public keys
of their customers.
The flow of Figure 3 is summarized as follows:
Step 1 Originator transfer request and consent to release data: In this step, the originator
Alice (alice$ovasp.com) request its VASP (Originator-VASP) to transfer assets to a
beneficiary Bob (bob$bvasp.com). In requesting the asset transfer Alice is explicitly
providing consent for the Originator-VASP to release a copy of her customer information
to a Beneficiary-VASP.
Step 2 Mutual verifications of VASP identities & secure channel establishment: At this
step, the Originator-VASP initiates an interaction with the Beneficiary-VASP by com-
mencing a TLS/SSL handshake within which both parties exchange their identity EV-
Certificates.
The first task of each VASP is to evaluate whether the other VASP respectively is a
regulated VASP under the Travel Rule. If either of the VASPs are unsatisfied (e.g.
EV-certificate information fields incomplete, VASP data is unverifiable, etc.) they can
return an error message in the TLS/SSL secure channel and abort the interaction.
Step 3 Obtaining beneficiary consent: In this step the Originator-VASP requests the consent
from the beneficiary (Bob) through the Beneficiary-VASP.
Step 4 Beneficiary provides consent: If the beneficiary agrees to receive the virtual asset
and agrees for his customer information to be released to the Originator-VASP, then
Beneficiary-VASP can proceed to capture this consent.
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One mechanism that can be used to capture consent is for the Beneficiary-VASP to
issue a signed assertion recording the consent of the beneficiary. Several protocols
exist today in the identity management area to represent this consent assertion (e.g.
SAML2.0 assertions [33], W3C Claims [32]).
Step 5 Transmission of beneficiary consent assertion: Within the secure channel established
in Step 2, the Beneficiary-VASP transmits to the Originator-VASP: (i) the beneficiary
customer information, and (ii) the signed beneficiary consent.
Step 6 Originator-VASP transfers asset on blockchain: Once the Originator-VASP is sat-
isfied with the information regarding the beneficiary, the Originator-VASP transmits
the asset transfer transaction to the blockchain. The transaction is addressed to the
public-key of the beneficiary.
Step 7 Beneficiary-VASP Receives Asset: Once the transaction is confirmed (i.e. settles)
on the blockchain, both the Beneficiary-VASP and the beneficiary is able to verify the
block on the ledger of the blockchain
Step 8 Beneficiary verifies confirmed transaction: The beneficiary Bob is able to indepen-
dently verify the block on the ledger of the blockchain, and to verify his account at the
Beneficiary-VASP.
5.3 Privacy Challenges for Customer Information
Although beyond the scope for the current work, one of the key challenging issues related to
the Travel Rule is the privacy of customer information once it has been delivered between
VASPs in the information sharing network. This problem can be acute when one VASP
is located within a jurisdiction with strong privacy regulations (e.g. EU with GDPR [24]),
while the other is located in a jurisdiction with an incompatible privacy regulations. More
specifically, if a Beneficiary-VASP is located under a different legal jurisdiction (e.g. foreign
country) observing weaker privacy regulations than the originator’s jurisdiction, there are no
means for the originator (Alice) to ensure her customer information is not leaked or stolen
from that Beneficiary-VASP.
6 Attestations Infrastructures for Customer Crypto-Wallets
Another form for trust infrastructures pertains to the functions and services related to elec-
tronic wallets. In some VASP business models a VASP may support the use of customer
wallets, where the private-public key(s) of the customer is held within the electronic wallet
in the possession of the customer. Currently, there are several forms of electronic wallets,
ranging from software on mobile devices and PC computers, to specialized crypto-processor
hardware that offers key protection functions. There are also several types of enterprise-grade
secure hardware that can manage tens to hundreds of key-pairs, and can be the basis for an
enterprise-wallet.
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In the following we use the term regulated wallet to denote a wallet system (hardware
and software) that is in possession of a customer of a supervised (regulated) VASP [46]. The
understanding is that the customer’s private-public keys are within the wallet device, and
that the wallet device is in the possession and under the control of the customer. We use the
term private wallet to denote a wallet system belonging to an unverified entity. This implies
that in the extreme case the wallet-holder information is unattainable by a VASP, despite
the VASP querying other VASPs in the information sharing network.
6.1 Wallet Attestation Information Relevant to VASPs
Although the issue of customer wallet technologies are beyond the scope of the current work,
we discuss wallets briefly to illustrate the need for another form of trust infrastructure that can
support wallet-attestations [28]. We borrow the term regulated wallet from [44] to express the
need for customers of VASPs to employ wallets that are approved by VASPs, and which can
provide strong key protection and integrity-protected attestations, yielding reports regarding
the wallet internal state.
For a VASP, there are several types of attestation information that the VASP needs to
obtain from a wallet in order to deem the wallet to be a regulated wallet bound to a customer
account at the VASP. The following is a non-exhaustive list of some of the possible wallet
and key information that can be obtained using attestations [28]:
• Key creation provenance: Most current generation crypto-processor trusted hardware
have the capability to create/generate a new private-public key pairs inside the pro-
tected/shielded location of the hardware, and to maintain keys inside its long-term
non-volatile protected storage.
Key-provenance evidence is useful for VASPs in many use-case scenarios. For example,
in the case of a newly on-boarded customer with a wallet, the VASP may wish to
ascertain the provenance of the existing customer transaction signing key-pair found
in the wallet. If the provenance of the existing key-pair in the wallet is unverifiable,
then the VASP may require the customer (i.e. wallet) to generate a new key-pair inside
the wallet. This, in turn, provides the VASP with a clear line of responsibility and
accountability under the Travel Rule with regards to customer-originated transactions.
The VASP has exculpatory evidence regarding the on-boarding of the new customer
and the start of use of the new key-pair.
• Key-type evidence and key loss recovery: As mentioned previously, some crypto-processor
trusted hardware (e.g. TPMv1.2 [47] and TPM2.0 [48]) support the creation of non-
migrateable keys [49, 50]. A VASP may request periodic attestation-evidences from its
customers’ wallets regarding the type of the transaction signing key-pair(s) currently
in use (e.g. whether the private-key is non-migrateable).
The VASP may also require these non-migrateable keys to be backed-up to a secure
storage location at the VASP, using a secure backup/migration protocol appropriate
for the trusted hardware in the wallet [51].
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Figure 4: Overview of beneficiary wallet identification and attestation
• Evidence of signature-origin of transactions on the blockchain: Related to the key cre-
ation provenance and key-type, the use of a hardware-bound private-key to sign trans-
actions permits the device-origin of that transaction to be ascertained. This kind of
evidence may be important in scenarios in which the VASP needs proof that a set of
confirmed transactions on the blockchain originated from the specific device belonging
to one of its customers.
The reader is directed to [28] for further discussion of this topic.
6.2 On-Boarding and Off-Boarding Customers
There are a number of challenges related to the on-boarding of a customer possessing a wallet.
In the case that the customer wallet is regulated and previously known to another regulated
VASP, then there are some practical considerations that the acquiring VASP needs to address.
These include: (i) validating whether prior to on-boarding the wallet was regulated or private;
(ii) validating that the keys present within the wallet corresponds to the customer’s historical
transactions (confirmed on the blockchain); (iii) verifying whether a backup/migration of the
wallet has occurred in the past; (iv) determining whether the customer’s assets should be
moved to new keys, and if so, how the “old” keys will be archived; and so on.
The case of a customer leaving a VASP (i.e. off-boarding) also introduces a number of
questions that may be relevant under the Travel Rule. The releasing VASP may need to
address various question, including: (i) preparing evidence that the wallet was in a regulated
state whilst the owner of the wallet was a customer of the VASP; (ii) whether the customer’s
assets should be moved to a temporary set of keys, denoting the end of the VASP’s respon-
sibilities for the customer under the Travel Rule; (iii) obtaining evidence from the wallet
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that the “old” keys (non-migrateable keys) have been erased from the wallet device, thereby
rendering the keys unusable in the future by the customer; and so on.
7 Integration with User Identity & Claims Infrastructures
There is today a need for crypto-asset management systems to be integrated seamlessly with
existing identity management infrastructure functions, including identity authentication ser-
vices, authorization services, consent-issuance and consent-receipt management [52]. The
customer who is seeking to transact virtual assets on the blockchain needs seamless authen-
tication into their accounts at their VASP, whether connecting from their browser or their
wallet-enabled mobile devices.
7.1 Customer Identities and Digital Identifiers
Currently most users employ their email address as a form of user identifier in the context
of obtaining services on the Internet. These identifiers do not represent the user’s core
identity [53], and have short-term or ephemeral value (i.e. identifier can be replaced with a
new one). Typically, the entity that issues these human-identifiers are email providers and
social media platforms, and their role in the ecosystem is to provide mediated authentication
and credential-management on behalf of the user [52]. The industry jargon used to describe
these entities and platforms is Identity Provider (IdP).
A given VASP may choose to allocate human-identifiers to its customers, effectively mak-
ing the VASP a quasi-IdP entity. Alternatively, the VASP may simply accept the customer-
selected email address as an identifier, and accept its role as a Relying Party (RP) to the IdP
who issued the email address. The benefit of the later approach is that customer credential
management for the account at the VASP is off-loaded to the IdP entity. However, the VASP
must establish a business relationship with the IdP.
7.2 Identifier to Key Resolution Services
For VASPs offering key-custodial services – in which the VASP holds and operates a unique
private-public key pair for each of its customers – there is the question of how customers will
identify the beneficiary entity prior to an asset transfer. Most technically-savvy users today
employ either bare public-keys or hexadecimal representations of public-keys. However, these
approaches may not be suitable to non-technical users who prefer to identify the beneficiary
using an email address or something equivalent (e.g. PayID identifier [45]). Thus, a stan-
dardized mechanism is needed to map or resolve from a human-friendly beneficiary-identifier
(such as an email address or PayID address) to the public-key of the beneficiary.
The identifier-to-key resolution service need to address the following use-case scenarios:
• VASP key-custodial model: Given an email address or PayID of a beneficiary, the
resolution service must return one or more VASP identifiers corresponding to the VASPs
who may hold the public-key of the beneficiary.
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Figure 5: Identifier to public-key resolution services
Note that since a beneficiary may have multiple public-keys (some active, some depre-
cated), the resolution service must return (i) the identifiers of all VASPs known to the
resolution service to possess (or to have previously possessed) the public-keys associated
with the beneficiary identifier, and (ii) a time-value of the last known update made to
this association or binding between the beneficiary identifier and the public-key.
• Regulated wallet model: For regulated wallets – namely wallet systems or devices associ-
ated with an account at a VASP – the resolution service should return the beneficiary’s
wallet device-identifier and the Beneficiary-VASP identifier.
An overview of the resolution services is shown in Figure 5. In Step 1 the originator (Alice)
provides her Originator-VASP with the identifier of the beneficiary as known to Alice (e.g.
Bob’s email address bob@emailprovider.com, or PayID identifier bob$somevasp.com). The
Originator-VASP resolves the identifier to one or more VASPs who may know the public-
key of the beneficiary (Step 2 and Step 3). Depending on the resolution protocol and its
configuration, the service may additionally return one or more public-keys associated with
the beneficiary. Once the Originator-VASP discovers one or more possible Beneficiary-VASPs,
the Originator-VASP can send a separate inquiry to each of these possible Beneficiary-VASPs
(Step 4). A given Beneficiary-VASP may also perform its own look-up/resolution regarding
the originator Alice (Step 5 and Step 6 in Figure 5).
In order to scale-up the identifier resolution services, VASPs need to establish a federation
of their resolution services. This federation can be achieved more easily if a VASP information
sharing network was already in place.
18
7.3 The VASP as Identifier-to-Key Binding Authority
Related to the question of how the resolution (from identifier to public-key) is performed,
there is also the question of who has the authority to perform this binding and unbinding (i.e.
revocation of the binding). The traditional method to express this key-ownership relationship
– between a user associated with an identifier and their public-key – is a digital certificate
(i.e. X.509) signed by a certification authority. Independent of the technical mechanism to
perform this binding, there is the question of who should authoritatively perform the binding.
VASPs maybe in a good position to perform the binding, notably in the key-custodial
case where the VASP holds the customer’s private-public keys. Since the VASP is already a
legal custodian and operator of the keys, the VASP can readily create and assert this binding.
The VASP may use the classical X.509 certificate management approach [54], and then place
a copy of the certificate in the resolution server or a blockchain [55]. Alternatively, the VASP
can simply load the latest public-key of the customer into the identifier-key resolution server,
and then sign the relevant records on the server (i.e. similar to DNSSEC [56, 57]).
More recent proposals have been put forward to allow a user to self-assert key ownership
by recording it on a blockchain [58, 59]. In this blockchain-based key registration approach,
the private-key is used to sign the transaction record (i.e. in the block) that contains the
identifier to public-key binding. This approach has the advantage of providing freedom to
users to manage their key-pairs. However, the speed of revocation is dependent on the
block-conformations throughput of the blockchain system. A further downside is that the
self-asserted binding lacks a legal underpinning (i.e. CPS service agreement [60]) in cases
where a counter-party may choose to dispute the binding.
7.4 Customer Managed Access to Claims
As mentioned previously in the context of beneficiary consent, there is a need for mechanisms
to permit consent management for originator/beneficiary customers, for (i) the virtual asset
transfers and (ii) the transmittal of customer account information (i.e. customer data). These
mechanism should integrate with and leverage existing identity services infrastructures that
implement Single Sign-On (SSO) protocols (e.g. SAML2.0 Web-SSO [61]) or token-based
authorization (e.g. OAuth2.0 [62]).
In scenarios where the VASPs already holds customer account information, the con-
sent flow can be relatively simple, consisting of the customer providing explicit consent to
the VASP using an authorization-token. The authorization-token can be one based on the
OAuth2.0 framework [62], which is currently popular within many social media platform
providers.
In scenarios where an external entity is the source of the customer information (e.g.
assertions [33] or claims [32]), the VASP is dependent on the external entity – typically
referred to as the Claims Provider (CP) – for truthful information about the customer. The
customer may have a personal store of copies of these signed claims, referred to as the Claims
Store. In this case the customer must then provide authorization to its VASP to retrieve
19
Figure 6: Overview of originator authorization for VASP to retrieve claims
the relevant claims from the Claims Store. An extension to the OAuth2.0 framework that
permits this flow is the User Managed Access (UMA) protocol [63, 64].
A high-level illustration of the interaction among the entities is shown in Figure 6. Here,
the Originator-VASP seeks to obtain signed claims (assertions) regarding the originator (Al-
ice). In Figure 6 Alice as originator performs a request for asset-transfer to its Originator-
VASP, who redirects Alice to an Identity Provider (IdP) in Step (1) for mediated authen-
tication. After Alice has been successfully authenticated by the IdP, the IdP returns the
result of the authentication in Step (2) to the Originator-VASP (as the Relying Party of the
authentication event) together with an authorization-token. The authorization-token repre-
sents Alice’s explicit authorization (consent) for the Originator-VASP to retrieve a copy of
the signed claims (indicated in the token) from the Claims Store and to share these claims
with the Beneficiary-VASP.
The Originator-VASP presents the authorization-token to the Claims Store in Step (3a)
and Step (3b). The Claims Store acts as the Resource Server (RS) in the OAuth2.0 context.
Upon obtaining the relevant claims, the Originator-VASP issues a consent-receipt [65] to Alice
in Step 4. The receipt may contain a hash of the claims obtained by the Originator-VASP.
The receipt acts exculpatory evidence covering the Originator-VASP, showing which claims
or assertions it fetched and delivered to the Beneficiary-VASP over the information sharing
network in Step (5). In any case, Alice can check this consent-receipt against the access log
in her Claims Store.
It is worth noting that there are several ways to implement the Claims Store. It can be a
Resource Server operating under the control of a service provider (including by the Originator-
VASP as service provider), it can reside on the Alice’s own mobile device (running a con-
strained Resource Server), it can be placed in cloud-based Trusted Execution Environment
20
(TEE) [66], or it may implemented in a decentralized file system such as IPFS/Filecoin [67]. A
decentralized identifier (DID) scheme [59] may assist a VASP in resolving customer identifier
to correct Claims Store.
7.5 Provenance and Accuracy of Claims
When an Originator-VASP delivers customer information to the Beneficiary-VASP in the
form of a claim or assertion, the VASP is effectively standing behind the truthfulness of the
statements made in the claim/assertion. For example, the customer information could include
their present address, some form of identification number (e.g. national identity number),
account number at the VASP and so on.
A core concern for VASPs is ensuring that the information they obtain regarding their
customer is accurate and of known provenance. A given VASP may itself perform the vali-
dation of customer information, or rely on a third-party data source (i.e. Claims Provider)
for the information. This issue is notably complex when the customer of a VASP resides in
a different legal jurisdiction as the VASP, or where the VASP is simply unable to validate
basic information about the customer.
When an Originator-VASP received signed claims from a third-party and is satisfied with
the information, the Originator-VASP must “repackage” part or all of the information into
new claims, sign it, and deliver it to the Beneficiary-VASP. It is insufficient, we believe, for
the Originator-VASP to simply forward claims signed by a third-party to the Beneficiary-
VASP. A Beneficiary-VASP must validate the signatures on received claims to ensure they
are signed by the Originator-VASP.
8 Conclusions
The VASP information sharing network is only one component of the trust infrastructures
needed if blockchain systems and virtual assets are to be the foundation of the future global
digital economy. VASPs need to view this information sharing network as a foundational
building block for other infrastructures to be developed.
VASPs also need for a trusted identity infrastructure that allow VASPs to authenticate
each other and to rapidly ascertain the business legal status of other VASPs. The use of
extended-validation digital certificates offers a promising solution to this problem, based on
well understood and widely deployed public key certificates management technologies.
Finally, other trust infrastructures will be needed in order to address use-cases related
to customer wallets and device attestations from wallets. In particular, VASPs may need
evidence that the customer’s private-key truly resides within the wallet device. This provides
a means for VASPs to prove that they are not the legal operator of the customer’s private-
public keys.
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